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A. The optimizing programs of the model and other technical details.
Households
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the preferences of the ith representative household are
deﬁned by a non-separable utility function speciﬁcation, which for period t reads
(ct(i)− hct−1)
1−σc
1− σc

exp

σc − 1
1 + σl
(lt(i))
1+σl

,
where σc, σl > 0 are the risk aversion and the inverse of Frisch elasticity, respectively; 0 < h < 1
is the consumption (external) habit parameter, ct(i) is the household-level current consumption of
bundles of goods, ct−1 is lagged aggregate consumption of these bundles, and lt(i) is the household-
speciﬁc supply of labor.
The sources of household income are labor and capital earnings, equity return and the interest
service of government bonds. The nominal wage is set by households as they have market power to
supply a diﬀerentiated labor service. Thus, the representative household determines the nominal
wage Wt(i) constrained by its labor demand schedule. Labor income is (Wt(i)/P
c
t ) lt (j), where the
real wage is measured in consumption bundles at the Consumer Price Index (CPI), P ct . Capital
income is rkt ut(i)kt−1(i) where r
k
t is the market real rental rate, ut(i) is the variable capital utilization
rate and kt−1(i) is the stock of capital installed in the previous period. Another source of income is
equity ownership. Let dt denote the average real dividend and vt the average real equity value. The
representative household gets (nst/nt−1) dtxt−1(i) as the total dividends from her ownership of the
share xt−1(i) of incumbent ﬁrms, and (n
s
t/nt−1) dtn
E
t (i) from the entries of the previous period that
do not fail in its ﬁrst period of life. There is also some revenue from business destruction, which
corresponds to both the liquidation value of the exit share, (nxt /nt−1) lvtxt−1(i), where lvt is the real
liquidation value per business unit, and the liquidation of new goods that shut down after the ﬁrst
period of life, (nxt /nt−1) lvtn
e
t(i). Gross income turns into net income when subtracting the amount
of real tax payments, tt(i).
Net income is spent on purchases of bundles of consumption goods, ct(i), on investment on capital
goods, it(i), on portfolio investment on incumbents, vt (xt(i)− (n
s
t/nt−1) xt−1(i)), on net purchases
of real government bonds,

exp

εbt

(1 + rt)

−1
bt(i)− bt−1(i), where rt is the real rate of return and
εbt is a risk-premium AR(1) shock, and on the cost of creating new goods, exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ectn
e
t+1(i),
where εet is an AR(1) entry cost shock, f
e is the unit real cost of a license fee required by the
government to begin the production of a new variety and ect is a variable entry cost to be deﬁned
below. In addition, there is some expenditure on covering the adjustment cost of variable capital
utilization, a(ut(i))kt−1(i) where a(ut(i)) is the adjustment cost variable described in Smets and
Wouters (2007). As a result, the budget constraint of the representative household in period t
1
becomes,
Wt(i)
P ct
lt (i) + r
k
t ut(i)kt−1(i) +

nst
nt−1
(dt + vt) +
nxt
nt−1
lvt

(xt−1(i) + n
e
t(i))− tt(i) =
ct(i) + it(i) + a(ut(i))kt−1(i) + vtxt(i) +
bt(i)
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1(i) +

exp (εet) f
E + ect

net+1(i). (A1)
Capital accumulation is costly as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Thus, the equation of motion for
capital is,
kt(i) = (1− δk) kt−1(i) + exp

εit
 	
1− S

it(i)
it−1(i)


it(i), (A2)
where δk is the constant rate of capital depreciation rate, S(it(i)/it−1(i)) is the investment adjust-
ment cost function with the steady-state properties S (1) = S′ (1) = 0 and S ′′ (1) = ϕk > 0, and ε
i
t
is an stochastic AR(1) shock to the price of investment relative to consumption goods.
Following Erceg et al. (2000), households can set the nominal wage of their speciﬁc labor service
supplied, subject to a market signal that arrives with a constant probability as in Calvo (1983).
Let 0 < ξw < 1 represent the probability that the household is not able to set the optimal wage. In
that case, the adjustment of the nominal wage would follow this indexation rule
Wt(.) = Wt−1(.)

(1 + πct−1)
ιw(1 + πc + εWt )
1−ιw

,
in which πct−1 is the lag of the rate of CPI inﬂation, π
c
t−1 =

P ct−1/P
c
t−2

− 1, the steady-state CPI
rate is πc, there is an ARMA(1,1) stochastic component introduced through the wage-push shock
εwt , and 0 < ιw < 1 is the parameter that determines the indexation share that mirrors lagged
CPI inﬂation. As wage setters, households face the labor demand constraint á la Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977)
lt (i) =

Wt (i)
Wt

−θw
lt, (A3)
where Wt =
 1
0
Wt (i)
1−θw di
 1
1−θw
and lt =
 1
0
lt(i)
θw−1
θw di
 θw
θw−1
are, respectively, the aggregate
indices of nominal wages and labor with a constant elasticity of substitution θw > 0. Assuming a
constant discount factor per period, β < 1, the optimizing program of the household consists of
maximizing
Et
∞
j=0
βj

(ct+j(i)− hct−1+j)
1−σc
1− σc

exp

σc − 1
1 + σl
(lt+j(i))
1+σl

subject to the budget constraint (A1), the capital accumulation constraint (A2), and the labor
demand constraint (A3), for current period t and the expected expressions in all future periods.
The ﬁrst order conditions are computed with respect to the choice variables ct(i), ut(i), kt(i), bt(i),
Wt(i), xt(i), and n
e
t+1(i). It should be noticed that the desired number of entries are decided one
period in advance, which may capture time-to-build requirements. The behavioral equations for
consumption, investment, and wage inﬂation are equivalent to those derived and described in Smets
2
and Wouters (2003), with just some diﬀerences in the wage inﬂation dynamics: we do not have a
labor supply shock and the indexation rule is written in response to both CPI inﬂation and the
cost-push shock on wages.1 The ﬁrst order conditions on the portfolio choices of equity, xt(i), and
goods creation, net(i), both unusual in DSGE models, are, respectively,
−λtvt + βEtλt+1

nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1) +
nxt+1
nt
lvt+1

= 0, (A4)
βEtλt+1

nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1) +
nxt+1
nt
lvt+1

− λt (exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect) = 0, (A5)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint in period t. The ﬁrst order condition
of bonds implies λt

exp

εbt

(1 + rt)

−1
= βEtλt+1, which can be inserted in (A4) to give the
equilibrium condition for equity investment
vt =
1
exp

εbt

(1 + rt)
Et
	
nst+1
nt
(dt+1 + vt+1) +
nxt+1
nt
lvt+1


, (A6)
that implies an average equity value equal to the discounted sum of the expected returns when sur-
viving,

nst+1/nt

(dt+1 + vt+1), and the expected return when dying,

nxt+1/nt

lvt+1. Remarkably,
the equilibrium equity value depends (positively) on the rate of business survival, nst+1/nt, as the
weight for the return on surviving equity, and on the expected next-period liquidation value, Etlvt+1,
as the anticipated return from the fraction of goods that are expected to have their production shut
down.
Establishments (ﬁrms)
There are both single-good and composite-good establishments (ﬁrms) in the goods market.
Single-good establishments combine labor and capital within a ﬁrm-speciﬁc production technology
to supply heterogeneous consumption goods that are sold in a monopolistically competitive market
to the composite-good ﬁrm. Single-good producers are price setters constrained by nominal rigidities
and demand conditions. The composite-good ﬁrm aggregates all the varieties of consumption goods
to make them available as consumption bundles in a fully-competitive market.
Single-good establishments
In period t, the representative establishment type ω produces a quantity yt (ω) of this good using
the Cobb-Douglas production technology,
yt (ω) = exp (ε
a
t ) z (ω) k
α
t (ω) (exp (γt) lt (ω))
1−α , (A7)
1The wage inﬂation equation is displayed below in this technical appendix as part of the semi-loglinear set of
dynamic equations of the model.
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where 0 < α < 1 is the capital share parameter, lt (ω) and kt (ω) are respectively the demand for
labor and capital at ﬁrm ω, εat is a labor-augmenting and economy-wide AR(1) technology shock,
z(ω) is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level, and γ is the long-run rate of economic growth. While
the shock εat is homogeneous to all ﬁrms, there is ﬁrm heterogeneity in productivity. Thus, the
representative establishment gets z (ω) as its speciﬁc time-invariant productivity, which is taken as
an individual draw from a Pareto distribution characterized by its lower bound zmin and the shape
parameter κ.2
Regarding market conditions, single-good ﬁrms operate in a monopolistically competitive market
as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Hence, the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc output, yt (ω), is demand-
determined in response to its relative price Pt (ω) /P
c
t and to the aggregate demand for bundles of
consumption goods, yt, as follows,
yt (ω) =

Pt(ω)
P ct

−θp
yt, (A8)
where θp > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution across goods.
In addition, single-good establishments face rigidities on price setting determined by a ﬁxed
probability scheme as in Calvo (1983). Let 0 < ξp < 1 denote the probability of not being able to
set the optimal price. In such a case, the price adjustment would follow the indexation rule
Pt(.) = Pt−1(.)

(1 + πt−1)
ιp(1 + π + εPt )
1−ιp

,
in which πt−1 is the lagged rate of producer price inﬂation (measured at the average steady-state
ﬁrm-level productivity z), π denotes the steady-state rate of producer price inﬂation, εPt is an
exogenous ARMA(1,1) price-push shock, and 0 < ιp < 1 is the coeﬃcient of the indexation share
that responds to lagged inﬂation.
In order to analyze optimal pricing, let us assume that the representative establishment ω in
period t receives the Calvo market signal to set the optimal price. Then, it will choose Pt (ω) to
maximize the expected stream of real dividends conditional to the lack of future optimal pricing
∞
j=0
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) ξ
j
p

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
P ct+j
1−θp
yt+j − wt+jlt+j (ω)− r
k
t+jkt+j (ω)

,
where βt,t+j, st,t+j (ω) and Π
p
t,t+j denote, respectively, the stochastic discount factor, the probability
of survival and the price indexation factor all of them between periods t and t + j. In addition,
wt+j = Wt+j/P
c
t+j is the aggregate real wage in any period t+ j.
3 The stochastic discount factor in
2The probability distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of z (ω) are respectively g(z (ω)) =
κzκmin/z (ω)
κ+1 and G(z (ω)) = 1 − (zmin/z (ω))
κ. The shape parameter κ must be higher than (θp − 1) to have a
well-deﬁned average productivity.
3The price indexation factor between t and t + j consistent with the indexation rule is computed as follows
Πpt,t+j =
j
k=0

(1 + πt+k)
ιp(1 + π + εPt+1+k)
1−ιp

.
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equilibrium is βt,t+j =
j
k=1

eε
b
t+j (1 + rt+j)

−1
and the probability of continuation between periods
t and period t+ j is given by the accumulated survival rate
st,t+j (ω) =

1 if j = 0
j
k=1

nst+j (ω) /nt+j−1 (ω)

if j = 1, 2, 3, ...
 .
The optimal choices of the ﬁrm must be subject to the expected schedule of Dixit-Stiglitz demand
constraints,
exp

εat+j

z (ω) kαt+j (ω) (exp (γ (t+ j)) lt+j (ω))
1−α =

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
P ct+j
−θp
yt+j, for j = 0, 1, 2, ...
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to the price, Pt (ω), labor demand, lt (ω), and capital demand,
kt (ω), are,
Eξt
∞
j=0
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) ξ
j
p
 (1− θp)

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
P ct+j
−θp yt+jΠpt,t+j
P ct+j
+mct+j (ω) θp

Pt(ω)Π
p
t,t+j
P ct+j
−θp−1 yt+jΠpt,t+j
P ct+j
 = 0,
−wt + (1− α)mct (ω) exp (ε
a
t ) exp ((1− α) t) (kt (ω) /lt (ω))
α = 0,
−rkt + αmct (ω) exp (ε
a
t ) exp ((1− α) t) (lt (ω) /kt (ω))
1−α = 0,
where Eξt is the rational expectation operator conditional to the lack of optimal pricing, and
mct+j (ω) is the Lagrange multiplier of the demand constraint in period t+ j (i.e., the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
real marginal cost). The ratio Pt (ω) /P
c
t+j can be decomposed in the following way
Pt (ω) /P
c
t+j =

Pt (ω) / Pt+j Pt+j/P ct+j = Pt (ω) / Pt+jρt+j,
by introducing Pt+j as the Producer Price Index (PPI): the average price across all ﬁrms that
have the steady-state average productivity z (and they diﬀer due to their speciﬁc Calvo pricing
histories). We also introduce ρt+j as their relative price in period t + j obtained as the ratio
between the referential PPI and the CPI
ρt+j = Pt+j/P ct+j .
Using such decomposition in the pricing ﬁrst order condition, the optimal price Pt (ω) becomes
Pt (ω) =
θp
θp − 1
Eξt

∞
j=0 βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) ξ
j
pmct+j (ω)
 Pt+jθp Πpt,t+jρt+j−θp yt+j
Eξt

∞
j=0 βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) ξ
j
p
 Pt+jθp−1 Πpt,t+jρt+j−θp+1 yt+j
 , (A9)
where the real marginal cost is ﬁrm-speciﬁc due to the constant ﬁrm-level productivity z (ω)
mct+j (ω) =
w1−αt+j

rkt+j
α
αα (1− α)(1−α) exp

εat+j

z (ω)
.
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Since )mct+j = w1−αt+j rkt+jα
αα (1− α)(1−α) exp

εat+j
 z
we can write an analogous expression to (A9) for the optimal price, P ∗t , set by the ﬁrm that operates
with the steady-state average productivity z
P ∗t = θpθp − 1
Eξt

∞
j=0 βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) ξ
j
p)mct+j  Pt+jθp Πpt,t+jρt+j−θp yt+j
Eξt

∞
j=0 βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) ξ
j
p
 Pt+jθp−1 Πpt,t+jρt+j−θp+1 yt+j
 . (A10)
Comparing (A9) and (A10) and noticing that mct+j (ω) = )mct+j zz(ω) yields
P ∗t (ω) =
z
z (ω)
P ∗t (A11)
In loglinear terms, the optimal price equation (A10) for the ﬁrm with average preductivity brings
the following relative price
*P ∗t − *P t = (1− βγsξp)Et ∞
j=0

βγsξp
j +)mct+j − *ρt+j + j
k=1

πt+k − ιpπt−1+k − (1− ιp) ε
p
t+k

.
(A12)
Next, let us recall the Dixit-Stiglitz price aggregator with Calvo-style stickiness and the indexation
rule Pt = 	1− ξp  P ∗t 1−θp + ξp (1 + πt−1)ιp(1 + π + εPt )1−ιp Pt−11−θp
1/(1−θp) ,
which can be log-linearized, using (πt − π) =
*P t − *P t−1 for the rate of PPI, to obtain
*P ∗t − *P t = ξp1−ξp ((πt − π)− ιp (πt−1 − π)− (1− ιp) εpt ) . (A13)
Combining (A12) and (A13) results in the inﬂation equation
(πt − π)− ιp (πt−1 − π)− (1− ιp) ε
p
t =
(1−βsξp)(1−ξp)
ξp
∞
j=0

βγsξp
j +)mct+j − *ρt+j + j
k=1

(πt+k − π)− ιp (πt−1+k − π)− (1− ιp) ε
p
t+k

,
where, by doing (πt − π) − βγsξpEt (πt+1 − π), simpliﬁes to the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve
(πt − π) =
ιp
(1+βγsιp)
(πt−1 − π) +
βγs
(1+βγsιp)
Et (πt+1 − π)
+
(1−βγsξp)(1−ξp)
ξp(1+βγsιp)
+)mct − *ρt+ (1−ιp)(1+βγsιp) εpt − βEtεpt+1 .
Composite-good ﬁrms
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Composite-good ﬁrms act as packers of single goods and sell the ﬁnal bundles of consumption
goods in a competitive ﬂexible-price market. The representative composite-good ﬁrm produces
bundles of consumption using the production technology that combines each of the nt single varieties
produced at the establishments as follows,
yt =
	, nt
0
yt(ω)
θp−1
θp dω

 θp
θp−1
, (A14)
where the elasticity of substitution of across single goods in the aggregate production function (θp) is
the same as the elasticity of substitution between individual goods in household consumption. The
amount of consumption bundles produced is not indexed for any speciﬁc ﬁrm because symmetric
equilibrium holds across all the identical composite-good ﬁrms. Thus, the corresponding price of
one consumption bundle can also be expressed in economy-wide terms as obtained from the Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator,
P ct =
	, nt
0
Pt (ω)
1−θp dω

 1
1−θp
. (A15)
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B. Short-run and long-run equilibria in the DSGE model with endogenous entry
and exit
Set of log-linearized (64) dynamic equations for ﬂuctuations around the detrended steady state
in the short-run equilibrium:
Law of motion for total number of establishments:
*nt = *nst + δn (*net − *nt−1) , (B1)
where δn = n
x/n is the steady-state exit rate. Decomposition between surviving and exiting
establishments: *nt−1 = (1− δn) *nst + δn*nxt . (B2)
Entry decision: *net+1 = *nt + ς−1  vec*vt − feec εet (B3)
Liquidation value: *lvt = εxt . (B4)
Exit decision: *nxt = *nt−1 + κ1−δnδn  *zcrt . (B5)
Productivity cutoﬀ point:
*zcrt = βγs+ κ(1−βγs)(ρ−Ω)Ω Et*zcrt+1+
(1− βγs)Et
+)mct+1 − (ρ−Ω)Ω *yt+1 − Rt − Etπct+1 + εbt− ρ−(ρ−Ω)θpΩ *ρt+1+ (ρ−Ω)βsΩ *lvt − βγsEt *lvt+1 ,
(B6)
with Ω = )mc z
zcr
evaluated in steady state. Relative prices as a function of number of goods:
*ρt = 1θp−1*nt. (B7)
Variety eﬀect from producer price inﬂation to consumer price inﬂation:
πct = πt −
*ρt + *ρt−1. (B8)
Output decomposition between intensive and extensive margin of ﬂuctuations:
*yt = *nt + *ρt + *yt. (B9)
Equity accumulation equation (portfolio investment):
*vt = βγv1Et*vt+1+βγv2Et *dt+1+βγ (v1 + v2)Et*nst+1+βγv3Et *nxt+1 + *lvt+1−Rt −Etπct+1 + εbt−*nt,
(B10)
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where v1 =
v
(1−δn)(d+v)+δnlv
, v2 =
d
(1−δn)(d+v)+δnlv
and v3 =
δnlv/(1−δn)
(1−δn)(d+v)+δnlv
.
Firm-level average dividend:
*dt = *yt + θp*ρt − (θp − 1) +)mct. (B11)
New-Keynesian Phillips curve from Calvo (1983)-type sticky pricing with indexation:
πt − π =
ιp
(1+βγsιp)
(πt−1 − π) +
βγs
(1+βγsιp)
Et (πt+1 − π)
+
(1−βγsξp)(1−ξp)
ξp(1+βγsιp)
+)mct − *ρt+ (1−ιp)(1+βγsιp) εpt − βγsEtεpt+1 . (B12)
Real marginal cost: +)mct = (1− α)*wt + α*rkt − εat . (B13)
Consumption equation featuring habits and non-separability between consumption and labor in the
utility function:
*ct = h/(1+γ)1+h/(1+γ)*ct−1 + 11+h/(1+γ)Et*ct+1 + (σc−1)wθw/((θw−1)c)σc(1+h/(1+γ)) *lt −Et*lt+1− 1−h/(1+γ)σc(1+h/(1+γ)) rt − r + εbt .
(B14)
Taylor-type monetary policy rule:
Rt−R = µR (Rt−1 −R)+(1−µR)

µπ (πt − π) + µy (*yt − *ypt )+µdy (*yt − *ypt )− *yt−1 − *ypt−1+εRt .
(B15)
Goods market equilibrium:
*yt = cy*ct + iy*it + rkky *ut + εgy εgt + (δn/(1−δn))ecy *net+1 + *ect . (B16)
Production technology for the average-productivity establishment:
*yt = α*kt + (1− α)*lt + εat . (B17)
Fisher equation:
rt = Rt −Etπ
c
t+1. (B18)
Wage inﬂation equation with Calvo (1983) sticky wages and indexation:
πwt − π
w = ιw

πct−1 − π
c

+ βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

− βιw (π
c
t − π
c)
+ (1−βξw)(1−ξw)
ξw
(-mrst − *wt) + (1− ιw) εWt − βEtεWt+1 . (B19)
where the log-linearized household marginal rate of substitution is,
-mrst = σl*lt +  11−h/(1+γ)*ct − h/(1+γ)1−h/(1+γ)*ct−1 , (B20)
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and the real wage dynamics are determined by the log-linear expression implied by its deﬁnition
(wt = Wt/P
c
t ), *wt = *wt−1 + πwt − πct . (B21)
Labor market equilibrium condition: *lt = *nt +*lt. (B22)
Capital market equilibrium condition: *kst = *nt + *kt. (B23)
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the log-linearized investment equation is,
*it = i1*it−1 + (1− i1)Et*it+1 + i2*qt + εit, (B24)
where i1 =
1
1+β(1+γ)−σc
, and i2 =
i1
(1+γ)2ϕk
, and the value of capital goods (Tobin’s q) is given, in
log-linear terms by the arbitrage condition,
*qt = q1Et*qt+1 + (1− q1)Et*rkt+1 − rt − r + εbt , (B25)
where q1 =
(1−δk)
(rk+1−δk)
. The equilibrium rental rate of capital can be found in the input demand
equations of the representative ﬁrm
*rkt = *wt −*kt −*lt . (B26)
Also, following Smets and Wouters (2007), the loglinear expression for capital accumulation is,
*kt = k1*kt−1 + (1− k1)*it + k2εit, (B27)
where k1 =
1−δk
1+γ
and k2 = (1− k1) /i2.
The supply of capital can be adjusted in the intensive margin (utilization rate) as well as the
extensive margin, *kst = *ut + *kt−1, (B28)
and the log-linearized variable capital utilization rate is,
*ut = 1−σaσa  *rkt . (B29)
Entry congestion cost *ect = ς *net+1 − *nt . (B30)
Entry rate dynamics(semi-loglinear approximation)
et − e =
e
ς

v
ec
*vt−1 − feec εet−1+ (*nst − *nt−1) . (B31)
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Exit rate dynamics (semi-loglinear approximation)
xt − x = κ (1− x) *zcrt (B32)
The potential (natural-rate) block is obtained repeating all the equations (B1)-(B32) with p super-
script to denote the values reached under no rigidity on both price and wage adjustments, with
the exceptions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (B12) that is replaced by the constant price
mark-up condition, *ρpt = +)mcpt , (B12p)
and the wage inﬂation curve (B19) that is replaced by the constant wage mark-up condition,
-mrspt = *wpt . (B19p)
Endogenous variables (64):
The following 64 variables: *nt+1, *net+1, *nxt , *nst , *ect, *zcrt , *lvt, *vt, *dt, *ρt, *yt, *ct, *it, *ut, *qt, *kt, *kst , *lt,*yt, *lt, *kt, +)mct, rt − r, Rt −R, πt − π, πct − πc, πwt − πw, *rkt , *wt, -mrst, et, xt and the same set with p
superscript to bring the variables corresponding to the potential block.
Exogenous variables (9):
- technology shock: εat = ρaε
a
t−1 + η
a
t with η
a
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηa

- risk-premium shock: εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + η
b
t with η
b
t ∼ N

0, σ2
ηb

- monetary policy shock: εRt = ρRε
R
t−1 + η
R
t with η
R
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηR

- ﬁscal policy shock: εgt = ρgε
g
t−1 + ρgaη
a
t + η
g
t with η
g
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηg

- investment shock: εit = ρiε
i
t−1 + η
i
t with η
i
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηi

- price-push shock: εpt = ρpε
p
t−1 − µpη
p
t−1 + η
p
t with η
p
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηp

- wage-push shock: εwt = ρwε
w
t−1 − µwη
w
t−1 + η
w
t with η
w
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηw

- entry cost shock: εet = ρeε
e
t−1 + η
e
t with η
e
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηe

- liquidation value shock: εxt = ρxε
x
t−1 + η
x
t with η
x
t ∼ N

0, σ2ηx

Set of non-linear equations that deﬁne the detrended steady state (long-run equilibrium)
There are 21 endogenous variables: n, ne, nx, ns, r, rk, v, d, )mc, ρ, y, k, l, y, c, i, w, ec, lv, zcr,
and z. The non-linear steady-state system to solve is;
z = zmin κ
κ− (θp − 1)
 1
θp−1
, (SSB1)
ne
n
=
1−

zmin
zcr
κ
zmin
zcr
κ , (SSB2)
ns
n
=

zmin
zcr
κ
, (SSB3)
11
nx
n
= 1−

zmin
zcr
κ
, (SSB4)
r = β−1 (1 + γ)σc − 1, (SSB5)
rk = β−1 (1 + γ)σc + δk − 1, (SSB6)
v =
β(1+γ)1−σc(n
s
n
d+n
x
n
lv)
1−β(1+γ)1−σc n
s
n
, (SSB7)
lv =
β(1+γ)1−σc(n
s
n )
1−β(1+γ)1−σc(n
s
n
)

1− z
zcr
mc
1−mc
 d
n
, (SSB8)
fe + ec = v (SSB9)
lv = (1− τ )fe, (SSB10)
y = c + i+ εg + (ec)ne, (SSB11)
ec = Θ

ne
n
ς
, (SSB12)
y = nρy, (SSB13)
ρ = n θpθp−1 , (SSB14)
d = (ρ)−θp y (ρ− )mc) , (SSB15)
y = z kα l1−α , (SSB16)
)mc = θp−1
θp
ρ, (SSB17)
1z

w
1− α
1−α
rk
α
α
= )mc, (SSB18)
w = θw
(θw−1)

c− h (1 + γ)−1 c
 
nlσl , (SSB19)
k = α)mcz
rk
 1
1−α
, (SSB20)
i = (γ + δk)nk. (SSB21)
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C. Average productivity.
The probability density function, g (z), and the cumulative distribution function, G (z), of the
Pareto distribution that delivers ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivities are, respectively,
g (z) =

κ(zmin)
κ
zκ+1
, if z ≥ zmin
0, if z < zmin

G (z) =

z
zmin
g (z) dz = 1−

zmin
z
κ
, if z ≥ zmin
0, if z < zmin
 .
The average productivity across all ﬁrms (with CES aggregation á la Dixit-Stiglitz) is
zt = (nxt /nt−1) (zxt )θp−1 + (nst/nt−1) (zst )θp−11/(θp−1) , (C1)
where zxt is the average productivity across exiting ﬁrms, and zst is the average productivity across
surviving ﬁrms.
Following Hamano and Zanetti (2017), zst is obtained from the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation scheme
bounded in the open interval between critical productivity zcrt and +∞
zst =

1
1−G (zcrt )
,
∞
zcrt
zθp−1g(z)dz
 1
θp−1
,
where using g (z) deﬁned above yields
zst =

1
1−G (zcrt )
,
∞
zcrt
κ (zmin)
κ zθp−1−κ−1dz
 1
θp−1
.
The critical productivity zcrt determines the split-up of ﬁrms between survival and exit in the
cumulative distribution function, which identiﬁes the survival rate as 1 − G (zcrt ) =

zmin
zcrt
κ
. This
can be introduced in the expression of zst to obtain
zst =

zmin
zcrt

−κ , ∞
zcrt
κ (zmin)
κ zθp−1−κ−1dz
 1
θp−1
.
Taking the ﬁxed elements outside the integral, we have
zst = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)

zmin
zcrt

−κ , ∞
zcrt
zθp−1−κ−1dz
 1
θp−1
.
The rule for the integral of an exponential function implies
zst = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)

zmin
zcrt

−κ
zθp−1−κ
θp − 1− κ
|∞zcrt
 1
θp−1
,
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which leads to
zst = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)

1−

zmin
zcrt
κ−1 
0−(zcrt )
θp−1−κ
θp−1−κ
 1θp−1
,
or, alternatively
zst = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)

zmin
zcrt

−κ 
(zcrt )
θp−1−κ
κ−(θp−1)
 1θp−1
,
which simpliﬁes initially to zst = κ1/(θp−1)  (zcrt )θp−1κ−(θp−1) 1θp−1 ,
and ﬁnally to zst = zcrt  κκ−(θp−1) 1θp−1 . (C2)
Analogously to the case of surviving ﬁrms, the average productivity for the set of ﬁrms that
decide to exit in period t is bounded between minimum productivity, zmin, and the time-varying
cut-oﬀ productivity, zcrt , as follows
zxt = 	 1G (zcrt )
, zcrt
zmin
zθp−1g(z)dz

 1
θp−1
.
Using the pdf speciﬁcation g (z) gives
zxt = 	 1G (zcrt )
, zcrt
zmin
κ (zmin)
κ zθp−1−κ−1dz

 1
θp−1
.
The critical productivity zcrt determines the split-up of ﬁrms between survival and exit in the
cumulative distribution function, which identiﬁes the exit rate as G (zcrt ) = 1−

zmin
zcrt

−κ
. This can
be substituted in the expression of zxt to obtain
zxt =
1−zmin
zcrt

−κ

−1 , zcrt
zmin
κ (zmin)
κ zθp−1−κ−1dz
 1θp−1 .
Taking the ﬁxed elements outside the integral, we have
zxt = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)
1−zmin
zcrt

−κ

−1 , zcrt
zmin
zθp−1−κ−1dz
 1θp−1 .
The rule for the integral of an exponential function implies
zxt = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)
1− zmin
zcrt

−κ

−1
zθp−1−κ
θp − 1− κ
|z
cr
t
zmin
 1θp−1 .
which leads to
zxt = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)
1−zmin
zcrt

−κ

−1 
(zcrt )
θp−1−κ−(zmin)
θp−1−κ
θp−1−κ
 1θp−1 .
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or, alternatively
zxt = (κzκmin)1/(θp−1)
1−zmin
zcrt

−κ

−1 
(zmin)
θp−1−κ−(zcrt )
θp−1−κ
κ−(θp−1)
 1θp−1 . (C3)
Using both (C2) and (C3), respectively for zst and zxt , in the average productivity expression
(C1), it is reached
zt =
 (nxt /nt−1)κzκmin (1− (zmin/zcrt )κ)−1  (zmin)θp−1−κ−(zcrt )θp−1−κκ−(θp−1) 
+(nst/nt−1) (z
cr
t )
θp−1

κ
κ−(θp−1)
 1/(θp−1) .
Survival and exit rates as functions of critical productivity, nst/nt−1 = (zmin/z
cr
t )
κ and nxt /nt−1 =
1− (zmin/z
cr
t )
κ, can be introduced to obtain
zt =
 (1− (zmin/zcrt )κ)κzκmin (1− (zmin/zcrt )κ)−1  (zmin)θp−1−κ−(zcrt )θp−1−κκ−(θp−1) 
+(zmin/z
cr
t )
κ (zcrt )
θp−1

κ
κ−(θp−1)
 1/(θp−1) ,
which simpliﬁes massively to zt = zκmin  κκ−(θp−1)1/(θp−1) .
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D. Data and measurement equations
The following table summarizes the data deﬁnitions and the measurement equations used for
the model estimation:
Series deﬁnition U.S. Data Model measurement equation
Quarterly change in per-capita Real
GDP, Yt/Lt
100log

Yt/Lt
Yt−1/Lt−1

γ+*yt−*yt−1
Quarterly change in per-capita Real
Personal Consumption Expenditures, Ct/Lt
100log

Ct/Lt
Ct−1/Lt−1

γ+*ct−*ct−1
Quarterly change in per-capita Real
Fixed Private Investment, It/Lt
100log

It/Lt
It−1/Lt−1

γ+*it−*it−1
Quarterly change in real compensation
per Hour in nonfarm business sector, Wt/ Pt 100log

Wt/ Pt
Wt−1/ Pt−1

γ+ *wt−*wt−1
Hours per worker (in natural logarithm)
in nonfarm business sector, htEMPt/LFt
log (htEMPt/LFt) l+*lt
Quarterly change in GDP Price Deﬂator, Pt 100log PtPt−1 π+(πt − π)
Quarterly shadow Federal Funds Rate, RQEt R
QE
t /4 r + π+(Rt −R)
Establishment entry rate (eﬀective), et 100

Net
Nt
− 1

e+ e(*net−*nt−1 + *nst−*nt−1)
Establishment exit rate, xt 100

Nxt
Nt
− 1

x+ x(*nxt−*nt−1)
Actual data series used as observables in the estimation are plotted within the next Figure:
16
Figure 1: Observable series from the US economy (1993:2-2016:2).
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E. The loglinearized equation for short-run ﬂuctuations of critical productivity, zcr
The exit condition at the margin is deﬁned in the text as follows,
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω) d
cr
t+j (ω) = lvt, (E1)
which can be rewritten in log-linear terms to read,Using the Dixit-Stiglitz demand constraints, and
the ﬁrst order conditions of labor demand and capital demand, the left-hand side of (E1) is
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω)

Pt+j (ω)
P ct+j

−θp
yt+j
	
Pt+j (ω)
P ct+j
−mccrt+j (ω)


,
where mccrt+j (ω) is computed at the critical productivity z
cr
t ﬁxed in period t for all future periods
because ﬁrm-level productivity is time invariant. Relative prices, ρt+j = Pt+j/P ct+j can be introduced
to obtain
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω)
Pt+j (ω)Pt+j ρt+j

−θp
yt+j

Pt+j (ω)Pt+j ρt+j −mccrt+j (ω)
 . (E2)
The relationship between the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price and the price at the average productivity is Pt+j (ω) =
z
z(ω)
Pt+j for any t+ j period.4 Using this result in (E2) yields
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω)
 z
z (ω)
ρt+j−θp yt+j 	 zz (ω)ρt+j −mccrt+j (ω)


. (E3)
Meanwhile, the average real marginal cost of any t+ j period is deﬁned at the steady-state average
productivity, z, which implies, mccrt+j (ω) = )mct+j zzcrt (ω) , and once inserted in (E3) gives,
Et
∞
j=1
βt,t+jst,t+j (ω)
 z
z (ω)
ρt+j−θp yt+j 	 zz (ω)ρt+j − )mct+j zzcrt (ω)


. (E4)
The loglinear approximation to (E1) is
(1− βγs)Et
∞
j=1
(βγs)j
*βt+j + *st+j (ω) + *dcrt+j = *lvt (E5)
Applying log-linearizing techniques to (E4) results in the following linear expression for the expected
stream of dividends
Et
∞
j=1
(βs)j *dcrt+j = βγs1−βγs mc zzcρ−mc z
zc
*zcrt (ω)+Et ∞
j=1
(βγs)j
*yt+j +  ρ
ρ−mc z
zcr
− θp
*ρt+j −  mc zzcρ−mc z
zcr
 +)mct+j .
(E6)
Inserting (E6) in (E5) yields
βγsmc z
zc
ρ−mc z
zc
*zcrt (ω)+
(1− βγs)Et
∞
j=1
(βγs)j
*βt+j + *st+j (ω) + *yt+j +  ρρ−mc z
zcr
− θp
*ρt+j −  mc zzcρ−mc z
zcr
 +)mct+j = *lvt
4We will prove this property for period t in subsection F of this appendix.
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and solving for *zcrt (ω), it is obtained
*zcrt (ω) = (ρ−mc zzcr )βγsmc z
zcr
*lvt − (1−βγs)(ρ−mc zzcr )βγs(mc zzcr ) Et ∞j=1 (βγs)j
  mc zzcrρ−mc zzcr  +)mct+j − *βt+j
−*st+j (ω)− *yt+j −  ρ
ρ−mc z
zcr
− θp
*ρt+j
 .
(E7)
Taking (E7) one period ahead and computing *zcrt (ω)− βγsEt*zcrt+1 (ω) gives
*zcrt (ω) = (ρ−Ω)βsΩ *lvt − βsEt *lvt+1+ βγsEt*zcrt+1 (ω) (E8)
+(1− βγs)Et
+)mct+1 − (ρ−Ω)Ω *yt+1 + *βt+1 + *st+1 (ω)− ρ−(ρ−Ω)θpΩ *ρt+1 ,
with Ω = )mc z
zcr
and where the stochastic discount factor and the expected survival rate in loglinear
terms are
Et*βt+1 = −(Rt − Etπct+1 + εbt) (E9)
Et*st+1 (ω) = Et*nat+1 (ω)− *nt (ω) = −κEt*zcrt+1 (ω) , (E10)
recalling the inverse relation between the survival rate and the critical productivity, nat+1 (ω) /nt (ω) =
(zmin/z
cr
t )
κ . Plugging both (E9) and (E10) in (E8), we get
*zcrt (ω) = (ρ−Ω)βsΩ *lvt − βγsEt *lvt+1+ βγs+ κ(1−βγs)(ρ−Ω)Ω Et*zcrt+1 (ω)
+ (1− βγs)Et
+)mct+1 − (ρ−Ω)Ω *yt+1 + (ρ−Ω)Ω Rt − Etπct+1 + εbt− ρ−(ρ−Ω)θpΩ *ρt+1 . (E11)
Since *zcrt (ω) depends in (E11) exclusively in current and expected future economy-wide variables,
the average critical productivity, *zcrt =  nt0 *zcrt (ω) dω will have log ﬂuctuations from steady state of
identical magnitude to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc critical productivity *zcrt (ω)
*zcrt = *zcrt (ω) ,
and the dynamics of the aggregate exit rate would be as follows
*nxt − *nt−1 = κ1−δnδn  *zcrt .
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F. Aggregation
Producer Price Index (PPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI).
The average of ﬁrm-speciﬁc prices Pt (ω) can be computed using the Dixit-Stiglitz weighted
average of the outcome of its current and past Calvo-type lotteries
Pt (ω) =
 (1− ξp)P ∗t (ω)1−θp + (1− ξp)ξp ΠPt−1,tP ∗t−1 (ω)1−θp
+(1− ξp)ξ
2
p

ΠPt−2,tP
∗
t−2 (ω)
1−θp + ...
1/(1−θp) (F1)
where P ∗t−j (ω) is the optimal price set j periods ago and Π
P
t−j,t is the price indexation factor applied
from period t− j to period t. Recalling the optimal pricing of the representative establishment (see
section A of this Appendix), we obtained a relative optimal price P ∗t (ω) =
z
z(ω)
P ∗t determined by
relative ﬁrm-level productivities, which can be generalized for any t− j period as follows
P ∗t−j (ω) =
z
z (ω)
P ∗t−j. (F2)
Inserting (F2) for j = 0, 1, 2, ..., in (F1) yields
Pt (ω) =
 (1− ξp)

z
z(ω)
P ∗t 1−θp + (1− ξp)ξp ΠPt−1,t zz(ω) P ∗t−11−θp
+(1− ξp)ξ
2
p

ΠPt−2,t
z
z(ω)
P ∗t−21−θp + ...

1/(1−θp)
,
where z
z(ω)
can be extracted from the bracketed term to reach
Pt (ω) = z
z (ω)
 (1− ξp)
 P ∗t 1−θp + (1− ξp)ξp ΠPt−1,t P ∗t−11−θp
+(1− ξp)ξ
2
p

ΠPt−2,t P ∗t−21−θp + ...

1/(1−θp)
. (F3)
The PPI is the average price set by establishments that operate with the average productivity, that
is computed through the Dixit-stiglitz aggregator as follows
Pt = 	(1− ξp) P ∗t 1−θp + (1− ξp)ξp ΠPt−1,t P ∗t−11−θp + (1− ξp)ξ2p ΠPt−2,t P ∗t−21−θp + ...
1/(1−θp) ,
(F4)
and which can be inserted in (F3) to yield
Pt (ω) = z
z (ω)
Pt, (F5)
implying implies the same proportional relationship for average prices as the one we found in (A11)
for optimal prices. Next, we will also ﬁnd a relationship between the PPI and the CPI. The Dixit-
Stiglit aggregator for the CPI is
P ct =
	, nt
0
P
1−θp
t (ω) dω

 1
1−θp
,
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where inserting (F4) for the average price of ﬁrms with productivity ω, we have
P ct =
, nt
0
 z
z (ω)
Pt1−θp dω
1
1−θp
. (F6)
The elements that are not ﬁrm speciﬁc can be moved outside the integral in (F5) to reach
P ct =
	z1−θp P 1−θpt , nt
0
z (ω)θp−1 dω

1/(1−θp)
. (F7)
The average productivity observed in period t is
zt = 	n−1t , nt
0
z (ω)θp−1 dω

1/(θp−1)
,
which implies
(zt)θp−1 nt = , nt
0
z (ω)θp−1 dω (F8)
Combining (F8) and (F7) gives
P ct = z Pt (zt)θp−1 nt1/(1−θp) ,
which simpliﬁes to the following expression for the consumer price index
P ct =
zzt Ptn1/(1−θp)t ,
and using the property of constant average productivity, zt = z, we have
P ct = Ptn1/(1−θp)t .
Aggregate labor demand,
 nt
0
lt(ω)dω.
Firm-level labor demand is consistent with the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm
wt = mct(ω)
(1− α) yt(ω)
lt(ω)
,
that brings the amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor demand
lt(ω) = mct(ω)
(1− α) yt(ω)
wt
. (F9)
For the ﬁrm that produces using the steady-state average productivity z, the amount of labor
demand is lt = )mct (1− α) yt
wt
. (F10)
Making the ratio between (F9) and (F10) yields
lt(ω) =
mct(ω))mct yt (ω)yt lt. (F11)
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The deﬁnition of the real marginal cost impliesmct(ω) =
z
z(ω)
)mct whereas the Dixit-Stiglitz demand
constraint brings yt(ω) =

Pt(ω)
Pt

−θp yt which can be jointly used in (F11) to obtain
lt(ω) =
z
z(ω)

Pt (ω)Pt

−θp lt. (F12)
Next, the average price with average productivity and any ﬁrm-speciﬁc price are proportional to
their relative productivities (as jointly implied by F3 and F4)
Pt = z(ω)z Pt (ω) ,
that we plug in (F12) to reach
lt(ω) =
 z
z(ω)
1−θp lt. (F13)
The aggregate labor demand consistent with (F13) is, nt
0
lt(ω)dω =
, nt
0
 z
z (ω)
1−θp ltdω,
that is equivalent to , nt
0
lt(ω)dω =
, nt
0
z1−θpltz (ω)θp−1 dω,
and moving outside the integral terms, nt
0
lt(ω)dω = z1−θplt , nt
0
z (ω)θp−1 dω. (F14)
Recalling the deﬁnition of average ﬁrm-level productivity in period t
zt = 	n−1t , nt
0
z (ω)θp−1 dω

1/(θp−1)
,
and using it in (F14) yields , nt
0
lt(ω)dω = z1−θplt (zt)θp−1 nt,
or, alternatively, , nt
0
lt(ω)dω =
ztz
θp−1
ntlt.
Using the property of constant average productivity, zt = z, we have, nt
0
lt(ω)dω = ntlt.
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Aggregate demand for capital,
 nt
0
kt(ω)dω.
From the ﬁrst order conditions of the representative ﬁrm, the capital demand is
kt(ω) = mct(ω)
αyt(ω)
rkt
.
Using analogous steps to those taken for the aggregate labor demand, ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital demand
is related to the demand under average productivity as follows
kt(ω) =
 z
z(ω)
1−θp kt, (F15)
and the aggregate capital demand becomes, nt
0
kt(ω)dω =
ztz
θp−1
ntkt.
Using the property of constant average productivity, zt = z, we have, nt
0
kt(ω)dω = ntkt.
Aggregate output, yt =
	 nt
0
yt(ω)
θp−1
θp dω

 θp
θp−1
Aggregate output is obtained as the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundle for a variable number of
varieties nt
yt =
	, nt
0
yt(ω)
θp−1
θp dω

 θp
θp−1
,
where using the Cobb-Douglas production function (A7)
yt =
, nt
0

eε
a
t z (ω) kαt (ω)

eγtlt (ω)
1−α θp−1θp
dω
 θp
θp−1
,
and also the amounts of establishment-level demands for labor, (F13), and capital, (F15), it is
obtained
yt =
, nt
0

eε
a
t z (ω)
 z
z(ω)
1−θp ltα eγtlt1−α
θp−1
θp
dω

θp
θp−1
(F16)
The deﬁnition of output produced at the establishment with average productivity z, i.e. yt =
eε
a
t zkαt eγtlt1−α, can be inserted in (F16) to yield
yt =
, nt
0
 z
z(ω)

−θp yt
θp−1
θp
dω

θp
θp−1
,
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where taking elements outside the integral, we get
yt = ytz−θp 	, nt
0
z(ω)θp−1dω

 θp
θp−1
(F17)
Plugging the deﬁnition of the average productivity in (F17), zt = n−1t  nt0 z (ω)θp−1 dω1/(θp−1),
gives
yt = ytz−θpzθpt n θpθp−1t ,
where using the property of constant average productivity zt = z results in the simpler expression
yt = ytn θpθp−1t (F18)
Finally, since the relative price is connected to the number of varieties as follows
Pt
P ct
= n
−1/(1−θp)
t
and (F18) can be rewritten in a way that displays n
−1/(1−θp)
t
yt = ytntn−1/(1−θp)t ,
then we can obtain an expression that shows how aggregate output, yt, can be decomposed between
the intensive margin (output per establishment with average productivity,
Pt
P ct
yt) and the extensive
margin (number of establishments, nt)
yt = nt
 Pt
P ct
yt .
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G. The overall resources constraint
The household budget constraint is,
Wt(i)
P ct
lt (i) + r
k
t ut(i)kt−1(i) +

nst
nt−1
(dt + vt) +
nxt
nt−1
lvt

(xt−1(i) + n
e
t(i))− tt(i) =
ct(i) + it(i) + a(ut(i))kt−1(i) + vtxt(i) +
bt(i)
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1(i) + (exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect)n
e
t+1(i).
First, plugging the labor demand constraint, lt (i) = (Wt (i) /Wt)
−θw lt, and the deﬁnition of the
real wage, wt = Wt/P
c
t , it is obtained
wt (Wt (i) /Wt)
1−θw lt + r
k
t ut(i)kt−1(i) +

nst
nt−1
(dt + vt) +
nXt
nt−1
lvt
 
xt−1(i) + n
E
t (i)

− tt =
ct(i) + it(i) + a(ut(i))kt−1(i) + vtxt(i) +
bt(i)
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1(i) + (exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect)n
e
t+1(i).
The aggregation across households implies
wtlt + r
k
t utkt−1 +

nst
nt−1
(dt + vt) +
nxt
nt−1
lvt

(xt−1 + n
e
t)− tt =
ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + vtxt +
bt(i)
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1 + (exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect)n
e
t+1,
where we used aggregation schemes for nominal wages, capital utilization, the stock of capital, equity
shares and bonds. Introducing the equilibrium condition for the portfolio shares, xt−1 = nt−1 and
xt = nt, it is obtained,
wtlt + r
k
t utkt−1 +

nst
nt−1
(dt + vt) +
nxt
nt−1
lvt

(nt−1 + n
e
t)− tt =
ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + vtnt +
bt
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1 + (exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect)n
e
t+1,
The law of motion for the number of varieties, nt = (n
s
t/nt−1) (nt−1 + n
e
t) , serves to cancel the
equity term vtnt in order to yield
wtlt+r
k
t utkt−1+ntdt+
nxt
nst
ntlvt− tt = ct+ it+a(ut)kt−1+
bt
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
−bt−1+(exp (ε
e
t) f
e + ect)n
e
t+1,
where replacing the tax variable for the expression implied by the government constraint, εgt =
tt + exp (ε
e
t) f
enet+1 − exp (ε
x
t ) (1− τ )f
e (nxt + (n
x
t /nt−1)n
e
t) +
bt
exp(εbt)(1+rt)
− bt−1, it is obtained
wtlt + r
k
t utkt−1 + ntdt +
nxt
nst
ntlvt = ε
g
t + (1− τ)f
e (nxt + (n
x
t /nt−1)n
e
t) + ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + ectn
e
t+1.
Recalling the expression to obtain the liquidation value, lvt = exp (ε
x
t ) (1− τ)f
e, and using n
x
t
nst
nt =
(nxt + (n
x
t /nt−1)n
e
t) ,we reach,
wtlt + r
k
t utkt−1 + ntdt = ε
g
t + ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + ectn
e
t+1,
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Next, introducing the input markets equilibria, lt = ntlt, and, utkt−1 = ntkt, yields,
wtntlt + rkt ntkt + ntdt = ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + εgt + ectnEt+1.
The average dividend of ﬁrms that produce single goods, dt = ρtyt−wtlt− rkt kt, can be substituted
in the previous expression to obtain,
ntρtyt = ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + εgt + ectnet+1.
Recalling the relation between aggregate output and ﬁrm-level output, yt = ntρtyt, we have
yt = ct + it + a(ut)kt−1 + ε
g
t + ectn
e
t+1,
and in a log-linear approximation around the detrended steady-state
*yt = cy*ct + iy*it + rkky *ut + εgy εgt + (δn/(1−δn))ecy *net+1 + *ect .
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H. Estimated shock decomposition for US data
Using the "shock_decomposition" routine of Dynare, we have obtained and plotted the quarter-
to-quarter estimated shock decomposition of the rate of growth of US real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita, the rate of growth of the US Total Private Establishments (TPE), the US
establishment entry (births) rate, and the US establishment exit (deaths) rate.
Next, Figures 2-5 display the results with the following legend labeling: e_x is the contribution of
the liquidation value shock, e_e is the contribution of the entry cost shock, e_W is the contribution
of the wage-push indexation shock, e_P is the contribution of the price-push indexation shock, e_g
is the contribution of the ﬁscal/net exports spending shock, e_i is the contribution of the adjustment
cost of investment shock, e_R is the contribution of the Taylor-type monetary policy rule shock,
e_b is the contribution of the risk-premium shock, and e_a is the contribution of the technology
shock. The "initial values" share reports the contribution that is not explained by any of the nine
exogenous variables.
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Figure 2: Shock decomposition: quarterly growth rate of US real GDP per capita (1993:2 to 2016:2).
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Figure 3: Shock decomposition: quarterly growth rate of US Total Private Establishments per
capita (1993:2 to 2016:2).
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Figure 4: Shock decomposition: rate of US establishment entry (1993:2 to 2016:2).
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Figure 5: Shock decomposition: rate of US establishment exit (1993:2 to 2016:2).
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I. The sources of ﬂuctuations in the Great Recession
The next two Tables collect the estimates of the structural parameters of the model for a sample
period that corresponds to the Great Recession (2007:1-2016:2):
Estimation of the structural parameters in the Great Recession
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 90% HPD interval
h: consumption hab its Beta 0.70 0.15 0.57 [0.46, 0.69]
σc risk aversion Normal 1.50 0.25 0.92 [0.81, 1.02]
σl : inverse Frisch e lastic ity Normal 2.00 0.50 1.59 [0.71, 2.45]
ξp: Ca lvo price rigidity Beta 0.50 0.15 0.80 [0.75, 0.84]
ξw : Ca lvo wage rigidity Beta 0.50 0.15 0.96 [0.94, 0.98]
ιp: p rice indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.38 [0.18, 0.56]
ιw : wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.26 [0.11, 0.40]
ϕk : cap ita l ad j. cost elasticity Normal 4.00 1.50 2.76 [0.81, 4.74]
σa cap ita l utilization cost elasticity Beta 0.50 0.15 0.79 [0.64, 0.93]
ς : entry cost elasticity Normal 2.00 0.50 2.41 [1.69, 3.18]
X : steady-state exit rate Gamma 0.0292 0.0025 0.0296 [0.0280, 0.0311]
κ: ex it shap e Normal 5.00 1.50 3.36 [2.77, 3.95]
α:cap ita l share in production Beta 0.36 0.10 0.14 [0.10, 0.17]
θp : D ix it-Stig itz elasticity Normal 3.80 1.00 2.51 [2.22, 2.82]
µπ : inﬂation in Taylor rule Normal 1.50 0.25 1.53 [1.22, 1.84]
µy : output gap in Taylor ru le Normal 0.12 0.05 0.09 [0.05, 0.13]
µ∆y : output gap change in Taylor ru le Normal 0.12 0.05 0.14 [0.08, 0.19]
µR : inertia in Taylor ru le Beta 0.75 0.15 0.80 [0.72, 0.89]
γ : steady -state technology growth , % Normal 0.35 0.10 0.07 [0.02, 0.12]
π: steady-state rate o f inﬂation , % Normal 0.45 0.10 0.48 [0.37, 0.60]
l: steady-state log o f hours Normal 415.0 5.00 411.4 [410.1, 412.9]
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Estimation of the exogenous processes in the Great Recession
Priors Posteriors
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 90% HPD interval
σηa : Std . dev . o f technology innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.78 [0.62, 0.95]
σηb : S td dev of risk-prem ium innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.19 [0.13, 0.24]
σηR : S td dev of monetary innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.14 [0.11, 0.17]
σηg : S td dev of ﬁ scal innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.93 [1.55, 2.30]
σηi : S td dev of investm ent innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.35 [0.23, 0.47]
σηp : S td dev of price -push innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.49 [0.29, 0.69]
σηw : Std of wage-push innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.30 [0.91, 1.66]
σηe : S td dev of entry cost innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.47 [0.27, 0.66]
σηx : Std dev of liqu idation innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.47 [0.21, 0.73]
ρa : Auto corr. o f technology sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.74 [0.65, 0.84]
ρb : Auto corr. of risk-prem ium shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.95 [0.92, 0.98]
ρR : Auto corr. of m onetary shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.49 [0.30, 0.66]
ρg : Auto corr. of ﬁ scal sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.55 [0.36, 0.75]
ρi : Auto corr. of investm ent shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.69 [0.49, 0.87]
ρp : Auto corr. of price-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.44 [0.17, 0.74]
ρw : Auto corr. of wage-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.22 [0.06, 0.35]
ρe: Auto corr. o f entry cost sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.52 [0.29, 0.78]
ρx: Auto corr. o f liquidation shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.59 [0.38, 0.79]
µp : MA(1) o f price-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.53 [0.28, 0.79]
µw : MA(1) o f wage-push shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.92 [0.85, 0.99]
ρga : cross eﬀ ect tech.-ﬁ scal/NX Beta 0.50 0.20 0.66 [0.39, 0.95]
We will examine here the origins of the aggregate ﬂuctuations in the shock decomposition of the
estimated model. The sample period we look at begins in 2007:1 and ends at the end of the sample
period, 2016:2, to contain the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and the years afterwards that belong to the
so-called Great Recession period.5
Figure 6 displays the partial quarterly contribution of each estimated shock of the model to
the actual ﬂuctuations of US real GDP growth during the Great Recession. Technology shocks are
5There is no reference to the role of entry and exit for business cycle ﬂuctuations during the subsample period
that belongs to the Great Moderation era (1993:2-2006:4) because it was found to be rather poor. The Bayesian
estimation of the model over this subsample period was not very successful in replicating second-moment statistics,
probably because of the little inﬂuence of net business formation for aggregate ﬂuctuations (documented in Section
2 of the paper).
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Figure 6: Sources of US real GDP growth variability (lines marked with *) during the Great
Recession.
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Figure 7: US real GDP during the Gret Recession period (2007:1-2016:2). Quarterly shock decom-
position.
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really important for the recovery path after the ﬁnancial crisis. In 2009-2011, Figures 6-7 show
that technology innovations contribute at around 1% positive for US economic growth and numbers
remain on the positive side until 2012. It could be argued that the enormous business destruction
that took place during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 (more than 100,000 establishments closed in net
terms) led to economy-wide technological innovations a few quarters later. This can be considered
a Schumpeterian interpretation (creative destruction), supported by the estimation results showing
technology shocks help the building up of the recovery path. In the second cell of Figure 6, we can
see the severity of the adverse risk-premium shock during the ﬁnancial crisis. In the third quarter of
2008 (Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy) the contractionary eﬀects of the risk premium shock had an
estimated impact of a 2.2% reduction of real GDP. The risk premium shock is still contractionary
until 2010, though its size and eﬀect on US growth is diminishing over time. Interest-rate shocks
show the role of unconventional monetary policy during the Great Recession. Initially, the Fed
intervention to cut interest rates to 0% provided some stimulus in 2008, with an average quarterly
contribution to real GDP growth of +0.45%. Later, the massive asset purchase program of the Fed
(QE policies), give a second wave of monetary stimulus in 2013-2015.6 In 2014, the year in which
the Fed’d balance sheet reached its highest value (around 4 trillion dollars) the average quarterly
eﬀect monetary shocks on real GDP growth is +0.63%.7 Fiscal policy turns inﬂuential for US real
GDP in several punctual quarters.8 In particular, there is a contractionary ﬁscal shock in 2011:1
that has a negative impact of -0.87% on real GDP growth. Other adverse ﬁscal shocks are displayed
in Figures 6-7 corresponding to the ﬁscal cliﬀ turbulences occurred in 2012-1014. All the remaining
shocks play a minor role on explaining US real GDP during the Great Recession. We could just
mention the price shocks in 2010-2011 as a consequence of the increase in the cost of energy (oil
price jumped over $90 a barrel), which are found to have a negative impact on US growth of around
-0.2% per quarter.
The following Table provides the mean contribution and the standard deviation of the innova-
tions from the nine shocks of the model, comparing across the full sample period and the Great
Recession:
6The observed series of nominal interest rate may capture the eﬀects of the QE policies because we have used the
Wu-Xia (2016) series of shadow interest rates which include negative observation.
7Actually, the expansionary eﬀects of monetary shocks estimated in the four quarters of 2014 (in terms of growth
of real GDP per capita) are +0.68% (Q1), +0.81% (Q2), +0.51% (Q3) and +0.50% (Q4).
8As discussed in Smets and Wouters (2007), the ﬁscal shock may also capture changes in external demand (net
exports) that are not considered in the closed-economy setup of the model.
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Shock decomposition for US real GDP growth, △*yt
Full sample, 1993-2016 Great Recession, 2007-16
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Technology, ηa 0.07 0.45 0.20 0.50
Risk-premium, ηb −0.08 0.52 −0.46 0.45
Interest rate, ηR 0.09 0.31 0.06 0.39
Investment, ηi 0.00 0.06 −0.01 0.06
Fiscal/NX, ηg 0.00 0.30 −0.02 0.32
Price-push, ηp −0.01 0.13 0.05 0.14
Wage-push, ηw 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05
Entry cost, ηe 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.12
Liquidation, ηx −0.01 0.13 −0.03 0.13
The sources of economic growth during the Great Recession are the technology shock (+0.20%
per quarter) and, in a weaker extent, the entry cost shock (+0.13% per quarter), the interest rate
shock (+0.06%), and the price-push shock (+0.05% per quarter). Meanwhile, the recession is mostly
justiﬁed on the demand-side risk premium shocks with a negative eﬀect of -0.46% per quarter on
US real GDP growth. Fiscal shocks are quite volatile (with continuous ups and downs) because
its standard deviation is almost as high as that of the interest rate shocks, but the overall eﬀect is
quantitatively small. Finally, entry cost shocks and liquidation shocks have opposite sign eﬀects:
the exogenous component of entry favours economic growth (+0.13% per quarter) while the exit
shock reduces it at -0.03% per quarter.
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